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Pro [Whose?] Choice:  How the Growing 
Recognition of a Fetus’ Right to Life Takes 
the Constitutionality out of Roe 
Rachel Warren* 
If this suggestion of personhood is established, the [case for abortion 
rights] of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life is then 
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Roe v. Wade’s2 granting of constitutional protection for the 
right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy was, in many ways, 
just the beginning of the true abortion rights debate.3  The rights 
of the unborn are a main issue in this debate—mainly whether 
they have rights as a human person that could protect their lives 
from ending before birth.  While the Court has since declined to 
officially and fully address the issue, there is a growing 
recognition of the personhood of the unborn child both from a 
medical4 and social5 standpoint.  One cannot help but wonder 
what impact the expanding recognition of fetal rights will have 
on the already shaky future of Roe. 
This Comment will argue that recent trends in legislation 
and modern scientific development call for the fulfillment of Roe’s 
own acknowledgement that the right to life will “collapse” the 
right to an abortion.  Part I lays out the history of abortion 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Chapman University School of Law.  B.S. Music Industry, 
University of Southern California.  I would like to thank Professor Celestine McConville 
for her invaluable guidance throughout the writing process, and Professor Ronald 
Rotunda and Steve Aden for their thoughtful advice.  I would also like to thank my 
husband, whose endless encouragement and unconditional support will forever amaze me. 
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973). 
2 Id. at 113. 
3 Amy Lotierzo, The Unborn Child, a Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe in Light 
of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279, 279 (2006) (pointing out 
that it was the landmark decision that spurred the “increasing recognition and expansion 
of the rights of unborn children in the various areas of the law”). 
4 See Robert L. Stenger, Embryos, Fetuses, and Babies: Treated as Persons and 
Treated with Respect, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33, 38 (2006) (showing how modern 
advances in the medical and scientific fields have led to conclusory evidence that human 
life is present from first existence). 
5 This Comment uses state and federal laws that give rights to the unborn to gauge 
the current societal values. See infra note 81. 
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jurisprudence, from the cases predating Roe, the Roe decision 
itself, and finally the cases following Roe.  Part II establishes the 
widespread acceptance of fetal humanity and rights in both 
science and law, as well as the likelihood that abortion 
jurisprudence is ripe for upheaval.  Part III then calls attention 
to the unavoidable competing interests of mother and child which 
the Court must address, as well as preliminary solutions 
anticipated by others.  Part IV concludes that, when weighing 
these conflicting interests, the right to life must prevail over the 
right to an abortion.6 
I.  HISTORY:  ROE V. WADE AND ITS PROGENY 
A. The Road to Roe 
Historically, the road leading to the Court’s landmark 
decisions in Roe v. Wade7 and Doe v. Bolton8 was built upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s right of privacy.9  Eight years before 
Roe officially constitutionalized the practice of abortion, the 
Court extended the right of privacy to the use of contraceptives 
by married couples in Griswold v. Connecticut.10  This decision 
marked the first time the Court expanded this right to 
reproductive decisions.11  The Court defended the right of privacy 
within the context of a private activity between spouses within 
their home, but never addressed practices independent of 
marriage or outside the home.12 
The leap from scrutinizing contraceptive restrictions to 
abortion laws came six years later when the Court addressed a 
statute that criminalized abortions unless it was “necessary for 
 
 6 It is important to understand at the outset that this Comment discusses the 
conflicting interests of the right to life versus the right of liberty associated with abortion, 
as opposed to the conflicting rights to live arising from potentially-fatal pregnancies.  
Because the right to abortion is currently based on the liberty-over-life reasoning, the 
latter “self-defense” argument is a topic best reserved for another day.  It should also be 
noted that a statute with an exception to save the woman’s life was precisely the type of 
law struck down in Roe. See infra note 189. 
 7 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 8 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
 9 Martin Rhonheimer, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of 
Life in a Constitutional Democracy, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 157 (1998).  The concept of a 
constitutional right of privacy was first introduced in a Harvard Law Review article by 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, where it was suggested that “each individual had the 
right to choose to share or not to share with others information about his or her ‘private 
life, habits, acts, and relations.’”  Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right of Privacy, 
21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (quoting Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)). 
 10 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id.  The Court called the invasion of privacy “repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id. at 486. 
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the preservation of the mother’s life or health.”13  In United 
States v. Vuitch, the Court held that a District of Columbia 
statute was not vague and broadened permissible abortions by 
expanding the term “health” to include both physical and 
psychological well-being.14  The majority did not delve into a 
privacy rights analysis for this particular statute.15  However, 
Justice Douglas’ dissent suggested that a “compelling personal 
interest in marital privacy” also included “the limitation of family 
size,” thus giving the Griswold holding a new possible 
application.16 
While a decision in Roe was pending, the Court briefly 
turned back to contraceptive restrictions in Eisenstadt v. Baird 
and expanded Griswold to include the use of contraceptives by 
unmarried individuals.17  Eisenstadt was also significant for 
abortion rights, as the Court laid groundwork for extending the 
right of privacy from simply preventing a pregnancy to 
terminating a pregnancy by asserting that “[i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married 
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”18 
Building on these principles, the Court delivered its 
decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton in 1973.  In this pair 
of cases handed down on the same day, the Court granted 
constitutional protection for abortions and rejected the notion of 
an unborn child’s status as a person under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and hence, its right to life.19 
B. The Landmark Decisions:  Constitutional Right of Abortion 
Solidified 
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton arose out of state statutes 
that, similar to the one upheld in Vuitch and found in the 
majority of the states, prohibited abortions except in situations 
 
 13 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 68 (1971). 
 14 Id. at 72; Karen J. Lewis, Abortion: Judicial Control, in ABORTION-MURDER OR 
MERCY?: ANALYSIS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 1, 2 (Francois B. Gerard ed., 2001). 
 15 Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 73. 
 16 Id. at 78 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 17 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972).  The Court acknowledged that 
the Griswold holding was based on the state having no business to enter into the sacred 
marital relationship, but nevertheless deemed this right to be inherent in individuals as 
well. Id. at 453. 
 18 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 19 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973). 
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where it was necessary to save the mother’s life.20  In a 7–2 vote, 
the Roe Court invalidated the statute and held that the “right of 
privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
concept of personal liberty . . . [or] in the Ninth Amendment’s 
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass 
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”21  
Thus, the constitutional right to an abortion was established. 
But what about the constitutional right to life?  The 
competing interest of fetal life turned on the Court’s decision as 
to whether the fetus was a person and therefore also had 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.22  One might 
expect that the right to live becomes inherent once that life 
begins.  However, Justice Blackmun specifically declined to 
address the issue, writing that the absence of a consensus in 
scientific and sociological ideology meant that the Court “need 
not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.”23  Instead, 
the Court simply held that the use of the word “person” within 
the Fourteenth Amendment referred to only post-birth.24  As 
such, any interest in the protection of the fetus could not be 
considered compelling enough to legitimize restrictions through 
the entire pregnancy.25 
 
 20 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–118; Doe, 410 U.S. at 182–83 n.4.  Roe was a challenge to a 
Texas statute that made it a crime to “procure an abortion” at any stage of pregnancy, 
subject to up to five years in prison with an exception only to save the mother’s life. Roe, 
410 U.S. at 117 n.1.  The class action lawsuit was spearheaded by a pregnant single 
woman, Jane Roe, along with her physician, James Hubert Hallford, who asserted that 
the statute was unconstitutionally vague and infringed upon the woman’s individual right 
of privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 120.  
Doe was a challenge to a similar Georgia statute, distinguishable from Roe in that it 
provided for more exceptions—serious threats to the mother’s health, likely grave birth 
defects, and pregnancies resulting from rape—and proscribed a sentence of up to ten 
years. Doe, 410 U.S. at 183. 
 21 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 22 See id. at 156–57. 
 23 Id. at 159.  One scholar has pointed out that just a few pages later, Justice 
Blackmun referred to the unborn child as “the potentiality of human life,” thereby 
indicating that a judgment call was in fact made as to whether the unborn was “human.” 
Michelle Haynes, Inner Turmoil: Redefining the Individual and the Conflict of Rights 
Between Woman and Fetus Created by the Prenatal Protection Act, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 131, 135 (2004) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (emphasis added)). 
 24 Charles I. Lugosi, Respecting Human Life in 21st Century America: A Moral 
Perspective to Extend Civil Rights to the Unborn from Creation to Natural Death, 48 ST. 
LOUIS U. L. J. 425, 431 (2004).  Rather than rely on information provided by the Defense 
regarding fetal development, the Court declined to find a clear definition of “person” 
within the Constitution.  Instead, the Court focused on the Constitution’s use of the word 
“citizen” which referenced a postnatal state.  Despite the fact that “person,” not “citizen,” 
was used in the Fourteenth Amendment, and despite the fact that state statutes 
expressly defined unborn children as human beings, the Court held that the unborn child 
had no rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–58 
(1973). 
 25 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
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While the unborn child could not assert any rights, the Court 
recognized that this newly-established “fundamental right” to an 
abortion was qualified and therefore subject to possible 
restrictions that served a compelling state interest.26  The Court 
again refused to use the beginning of life as a threshold and 
instead held that any state interest in preserving the life of the 
unborn would not be sustained until the fetus reached the point 
of what Justice Blackmun called “viability”—when the child 
could “live outside the mother’s womb and ultimately function as 
a contributing member of society.”27 
Although science at that time was unclear as to when 
“viability” began, the Court set standards based on “present 
medical knowledge” of the trimester progress of the pregnancy 
and declared that viability was reached only after the first 
trimester.28  Within the first trimester, no state interference was 
permissible; any decision to abort the pregnancy was left to the 
mother and her physician.29  In the second trimester, the state 
may begin to assert regulations, but only if reasonably related to 
the mother’s physical well-being.30  Even into the third trimester 
when the state interest becomes compelling, any regulations 
must contain an exception “to preserve the life or health of the 
mother.”31 
Significantly, however, the Court left the door open to revisit 
the issue upon more scientific evidence as to the personhood of 
the fetus, stating that “[w]hen those trained in the respective 
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to 
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the 
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate 
as to the answer.”32  Moreover, the Court stated that if the 
personhood of the fetus were established, the case for abortion 
 
 26 Id. at 154; Lugosi, supra note 24, at 431–32.  Because the unborn child had just 
been deemed a non-person, the compelling state interest was in the protection of 
“potential life.” See Michael S. Robbins, The Fetal Protection Act: Redefining “Person” for 
the Purposes of Arkansas’ Criminal Homicide Statutes, 54 ARK. L. REV. 75, 85 (2001). 
 27 Robbins, supra note 26, at 85; Lewis, supra note 14, at 4. 
 28 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
 29 Id.; Lugosi, supra note 24, at 432. 
 30 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; Haynes, supra note 23, at 135–36. 
 31 Lugosi, supra note 24, at 432 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64).  As will 
be shown in the concurrent opinion of Doe v. Bolton, to preserve the “health” of the mother 
means “all factors, physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age.” Doe 
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).  See infra note 35 for further analysis of the combined 
holdings. 
 32 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.  The modern consensus of these areas is discussed in Part II, 
infra. 
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rights “of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life is then 
guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”33 
In Doe v. Bolton, the Court built upon Roe’s newly-founded 
principles and expanded Vuitch to define “health” as including 
“all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the 
woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.”34  The 
significance of this holding is that states were now severely 
limited in establishing any compelling interest in restricting 
Roe’s constitutional right.35 
C. The Aftermath:  Regret and Calls for a Re-Visitation 
In the decades that followed Roe and Doe, the Court 
continued to expand abortion rights based on the unquestioned 
principles of the right of privacy and non-person fetal character.  
These expansions included striking down requirements of 
spousal or parental notification,36 scrutinizing attempts to 
restrict public funding for non-therapeutic abortions37 and 
narrowing the requirements for informed consent.38  Within a few 
years, the Court again addressed the viability issue, reiterating 
 
 33 Id. at 156–57 (emphasis added).  The fulfillment of this acknowledgement or 
“promise” by the Roe Court is discussed further in Part IV, infra. 
 34 Doe, 410 U.S. 179, 192. 
 35 JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 695 
(2006).  Many states had restricted abortions to that which was necessary to preserve the 
health of the mother, with the intent that abortions be permitted only in life-or-death 
situations.  With Doe giving “health” such an expansive definition, such statutes were 
now unconstitutional.  Instead, a woman was entitled to what scholars have called 
“abortion on demand.” FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, DEFENDING LIFE: A MORAL AND LEGAL CASE 
AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE 20 (2007). 
 36 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52, 69, 74–75 (1976) (holding that a 
married woman need not secure her husband’s consent to get an abortion as this would 
constitute an unconstitutional veto power of a third party; likewise, a minor need not 
secure consent of a parent to get an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) 
(affirming Danforth’s invalidation of blanket parental consent requirements);; City of 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 441–42 (1983) (affirming 
Danforth and Bellotti).  But see Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492–94 
(1983) (approving a parental consent statute because it contained a provision for judicial 
bypass). 
 37 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 443–47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977);  
see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302, 322 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, 
which placed a limit on federal funding for abortions through HHS programs such as 
Medicaid to cases where an abortion would be necessary to save the woman’s life, when 
pregnancy has resulted from rape or incest, or situations where the pregnancy caused the 
woman “severe and long-lasting physical health damage”). 
 38 See City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 450 (invalidating a 24-hour waiting period after 
consent); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
759–60 (1986) (striking down an informed consent statute that provided for disclosure of 
fetal development, possible psychological side effects and alternatives to the procedure on 
the grounds that this information might discourage the patient). 
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that the health of the woman would always prevail over the life 
of the unborn child.39 
Even in affirming Roe and Doe, the holding and reasoning 
began to be questioned by the Court itself.  A decade after Roe, 
medical technology had advanced enough to detect “viability” as 
early as twenty weeks.40  As a result, in City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health,41 three Justices—O’Connor, 
White and Rehnquist—voted to discard the use of Roe as a 
precedent.  Justice O’Connor criticized the trimester framework 
as “completely unworkable” because the stages of pregnancy 
would always “differ according to the level of medical technology 
available.”42 
Another significant criticism of Roe arose in Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.43  Chief 
Justice Burger, who had concurred in Roe, now filed a dissenting 
opinion in which he called for its reexamination.44  Chief Justice 
Burger expressed his regret that the concerns listed in the Roe 
dissents—endorsement of “abortion on demand” and the 
invalidation of any interest to protect fetal life—had now become 
an unwanted reality.45  Justice White attacked Roe’s illogical 
viability standard, pointing out that “the State’s interest, if 
compelling after viability, is equally compelling before 
viability.”46  Justice Stevens, though concurring in the majority 
opinion, took the opportunity to explain further that the right to 
 
 39 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386–87 (1979).  In Colautti, the Court 
considered whether to uphold a statute that required physicians to “preserve the life and 
health of the fetus [as though it were] intended to be born and not aborted” when the 
fetus is viable or if there is “sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable.” Id. 
at 380–81 n.1.  The Court found the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the 
term “may be viable” was not distinguishable from Roe’s definition of “viability.” Id. at 
390.  It also reaffirmed that the health of the woman must always prevail over the life of 
the fetus. Id. at 400–01. 
 40 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 20.  Roe had declared viability occurring only after 
twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks. Id. 
 41 City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 418.  Here, the majority acted characteristically in 
striking down an ordinance that required all second-trimester abortions to be performed 
in a hospital because it failed to serve the state’s interest of protecting the woman’s 
health. Id. at 449–52. 
 42 Id. at 452, 454 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor went so far as to 
admit that if viability kept getting pushed back all the way to conception, the right to 
have an abortion would disappear. BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 20. 
 43 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
(1986).  Here, the Court invalidated a statute requiring physicians to disclose alternative 
procedures, fetal development and possible psychological side-effects when obtaining 
informed consent and called for a second physician to be present in situations where the 
fetus might survive. Id. at 759–64. 
 44 Id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 45 Id. at 783–84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 46 Id. at 795 (White, J., dissenting). 
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life would trump the right to abortion in all states if the 
personhood of a fetus were to be recognized, stating: 
[I]ndeed, if there is not such a difference [between a child and a fetus], 
the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be 
left to the will of the state legislatures.  And if distinctions may be 
drawn between a fetus and a human being in terms of the state 
interest in their protection—even though the fetus represents one of 
“those who will be citizens”—it seems to me quite odd to argue that 
distinctions may not also be drawn between the state interest in 
protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in 
protecting the 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of 
birth.  Recognition of this distinction is supported not only by logic, 
but also by history and by our shared experiences.47 
This logical reasoning seems to have resonated when the 
Court found itself addressing the viability issue again only a few 
years later in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.48  The 
Court adopted the City of Akron and Thornburgh dissents in 
admitting that its constitutional construction of Roe’s trimester 
system was “unsound in principle and unworkable” and thus 
stare decisis should not be invoked to uphold it.49 
The Court stopped short, however, of overruling Roe.50  In 
admonishing the majority for failing to do so, Justice Scalia 
pointed out that Roe itself precluded any state from attempting 
to enact an identical statute, and therefore Roe would only ever 
 
 47 Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 48 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).  Here, the 
preamble to the challenged Missouri statute provided that the State recognized human 
life from conception and therefore all unborn children had rights as full citizens.  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2000).  Though this was contrary to its characterization of the fetus in 
Roe, the Court declined to determine the constitutionality of the preamble on the grounds 
that it did not in itself place regulations on abortion.  Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.  The Court 
asserted that it would place “no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value 
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.” Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 
(1977)). 
 49 Webster, 492 U.S. at 518.  According to the Court, the “rigid Roe framework” of 
trimesters and viability was inconsistent with the Constitution’s general terms and 
principles.  The resulting effect of Roe was therefore a “web of legal rules that have 
become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of 
constitutional doctrine.” Id.  The Court also echoed Justice White’s dissent in Thornburgh 
by stating “we do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life 
should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore 
be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.” 
Id. at 519. 
 50 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 33.  The reason cited by the Court was that the 
differing facts of the two cases made a complete reversal inappropriate: in Roe, the Court 
was considering a Texas statute that criminalized all abortions, while in the present case 
Missouri had merely determined that potential human life must be safeguarded at 
viability. Webster, 492 U.S. at 521. 
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“be disassembled doorjamb by doorjamb, and never entirely 
brought down, no matter how wrong it may be.”51 
One of these disassembled “doorjambs” came with Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey.52  The plurality opinion rejected Webster’s 
outlook on stare decisis and announced that Roe was not 
“unworkable” despite its “engendered disapproval” and thus 
upheld Roe’s viability standard.53  Yet, its refusal to overturn Roe 
was based solely on “precedential force” rather than the 
“soundness of Roe’s resolution of the issue;” the Casey opinion 
never affirmed that Roe was a correct constitutional 
interpretation.54  Such an omission subtlety, but quite tellingly, 
distances the Court from Roe’s reasoning and provides evidence 
of its recognition of the landmark decision’s flaws. 
Most significant to abortion jurisprudence applicability, the 
Casey Court did not label abortion as a “fundamental” right.55  
Instead, the Court acknowledged that Roe’s progeny had vastly 
ignored the state’s legitimate interest in protecting potential life 
because the rigid trimester framework made it nearly impossible 
for any regulation to be imposed within the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy.56  The Court attempted to repair this flaw by 
replacing Roe’s strict scrutiny standard with an “undue burden” 
test.57  This new standard permits states to enact regulations 
with the “purpose or effect” to protect potential life insofar as it 
does not place a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s 
choice.”58  As a result, state regulations are more likely to pass 
scrutiny.59 
 
 51 Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 52 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  The Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania Act with the usual categories of restrictions: informed 
consent, parental approval and spousal notification. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3209 
(2000).  The Court upheld four of the five provisions in the Act and struck down the 
spousal notification requirement. BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 33. 
 53 Casey, 505 U.S. at 860–61.  Interestingly, this joint opinion included Justice 
Kennedy, who had just three years prior joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Webster opinion 
that asserted exactly the opposite. Webster, 492 U.S. at 496.  After outlining the 
ramifications of overturning such a landmark decision, the Casey Court admitted that its 
decision was in part due to the fear that such an overruling would cause a loss of 
confidence in the Judiciary. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867. 
 54 Casey, 505 U.S. at 871; PAUL BENJAMIN LINTON, ABORTION UNDER STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 6–7 n.13 (2008). 
 55 LINTON, supra note 54, at 6 n.13. 
 56 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.  The Court pointed to Thornburg and City of Akron as 
examples. Id. 
 57 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 33–34; Lewis, supra note 14, at 14. 
 58 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.  See also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) 
(modifying the two-pronged Casey test of “purpose or effect” to just “effect”). 
 59 Lewis, supra note 14, at 14.  The Court further elaborated that a state’s interest in 
protecting the unborn meant that it could enact rules to ensure that the woman was fully 
informed of her options.  Under this standard, a state may even enforce measures to 
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Casey’s first major application by the Court was in Stenberg 
v. Carhart.60  Here, the Court struck down a partial-birth 
abortion ban on the grounds that it placed an undue burden in 
the woman’s path to getting the abortion.61  Because this 
procedure, known as Dilation and Extraction (“D&X”),62 could be 
performed pre-viability,63 and because the language of the 
statute could be confused for a permissible pre and post-viability 
procedure called Dilation and Evacuation (“D&E”),64 the Court 
found that the statute posed an undue, and thus 
unconstitutional, burden.65  The Court ignored the obvious 
viability issue, even though the child would have survived out of 
the womb had the doctor not killed her before delivery was 
complete.66 
In response to Stenberg, Congress passed the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which remedied the flaws in the 
Nebraska statute by clearly describing the procedure so as not to 
be confused with D&E.67  Congress also provided an exception to 
 
persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion.  This includes philosophic and 
social arguments, even during the first trimester. Casey, 505 U.S. 872–73, 878. 
 60 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 61 Id. at 929–30.  The Nebraska statute at issue restricted the practice of the partial 
delivery of “a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing delivery.” 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (LexisNexis 2008).  The Court also invalidated the 
statute because it made an exception only to save the life of the mother, rather than the 
Casey-required exception to promote the health of the mother. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930. 
 62 The D&X procedure, also known as “intact D&E,” is accomplished by the 
physician first dilating the woman’s cervix and then using forceps to rotate the child to 
the breach position and pull the legs, body and arms through the cervix and vagina.  Once 
the head is visible and lodged in the cervix, the physician forces scissors into the base of 
the skull and makes a large opening, in which he inserts a suction catheter to suck out 
the child’s brains and collapse the skull.  Once all contents of the brain are sucked out, 
the physician completes delivery by pulling out the emptied head.  The partially-born 
child has been observed clasping her fingers and kicking her feet until the physician 
begins to use the suction tube, at which point the body goes limp. Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 137–39 (2007). 
 63 Even the Plaintiff physician admitted that the D&X procedure would never be 
attempted before the sixteenth week but instead was actually intended for later-term 
pregnancies. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 927–28. 
 64 The D&E procedure consists of the physician first dilating the woman’s cervix and 
then inserting forceps, which are used to grab the unborn child and pull it through the 
cervix and vagina.  In the process, the friction of the forceps causes the child to be torn 
apart, and the physician removes the body piece by piece until completely removed.  It 
typically takes the physician 10–15 passes to remove all pieces of the dismembered body. 
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 135–36. 
 65 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938–40. 
 66 The separate dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy and Thomas, however, did not let the issue slide.  Each found that the very 
description of the procedure itself lent to an undisputable finding of protectable life and 
suggest how close the Court had been to overturning Roe. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 952 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 953–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 956–79 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at 980–1020 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 67 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
Do Not Delete 2/6/2010 4:36 PM 
2009] Pro [Whose?] Choice 231 
save the mother’s life68 and, unlike the state legislature, 
successfully cited findings that the procedure would never be 
medically necessary to preserve the woman’s health.69  Thus, 
when challenged in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court was obliged to 
find the undue burden in Stenberg remedied and upheld the 
ban.70  In addition to making strides towards protecting the 
unborn child, Gonzales also disassembled another Roe “doorjamb” 
by accepting the absence of a health exception.71  The Court 
found the exception to save the mother’s life sufficient, even 
though it essentially requires the woman to go to court first.72  
This is a far cry from Roe’s establishment of abortion on 
demand.73  While concurring in the majority, Justice Thomas—
joined by Justice Scalia—reiterated that “the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence, including Casey and Roe . . . has no basis in the 
Constitution.”74 
It is apparent that the abortion issue is as ripe as it has ever 
been.  Casey has re-opened the door to fetal rights, and Roe itself 
admitted that the legal status of abortion rights should change 
upon a better understanding of “when life begins.”75  Thus, an 
understanding of today’s scientific progress and the state’s 
acceptance of the unborn child’s personhood has a profound 
impact on the abortion issue.76  With the trend moving toward 
recognition of fetal humanity, a fundamental issue arises which 
cannot be ignored in an inevitable reevaluation of Roe: does a 
woman’s right to privacy truly outweigh a child’s right to live?77 
 
 68 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2006) (stating that the prohibition on the procedure “does not 
apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is 
endangered”). 
 69 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–105, § 2(13), 117 Stat. 
1201 (2003). 
 70 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). 
 71 Id. at 161–65. 
 72 18 U.S.C. § 1531(d)(1) (2006); Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168. 
 73 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 74 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 75 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973); Lugosi, supra note 24, at 437 (arguing that 
Casey “suggest[s] that it is time to think ‘outside the box’ and directly answer two 
questions: whether, as a matter of law, the unborn are living human beings and whether 
the law should confer constitutional personhood on unborn human beings from the time of 
conception until the time of natural death”). 
 76 The scientific data and trends in state laws have been pointing toward a 
widespread recognition that the unborn child is not only a living human being, but also a 
citizen entitled to protection.  The analysis of this data will be discussed immediately 
proceeding in Part II, infra. 
 77 This issue, its resolution among scholars and this author’s solution will be 
discussed in Parts III and IV, infra. 
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II.  CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:  THE REJECTION OF ROE AND 
ACCEPTANCE OF FETAL PERSONHOOD 
Within the Roe opinion itself, Justice Blackmun’s majority 
admitted that its rejection of the personhood of—and the 
constitutional protection for—the life of the fetus was related to 
the fact that “those trained in the respective disciplines of 
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any 
consensus.”78  While there may not have been such a consensus 
at that time, the passing of thirty-six years has allowed the 
expansion of medical technology and social understanding to 
close this gap.  Today, there is a trend toward recognizing the 
unborn as both a human as well as a person afforded lawful 
protection.79  Modern scientific advances in the understanding of 
human development show that the fetus is indeed a human being 
from her first day of existence.80  Societal values as reflected in 
current state laws81 show trends towards fetal personhood and 
citizenship—thirty-six states consider the killing of the fetus a 
form of homicide.82  This is an increase from twenty-seven states 
just five years ago.83  Further, even several Supreme Court 
Justices who dissented in Stengerg have expressed recognition of 
fetal humanity.84  These developments, coupled with the ongoing 
cumulative criticism of Roe’s reasoning,85 call for a reevaluation 
of the abortion rights issue with new consideration given to the 
life of the unborn. 
A. The Widespread Criticisms of Wrongful Reasoning 
An argument for fetal personhood would be moot if Roe and 
its progeny were universally hailed as an accurate constitutional 
 
 78 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
 79 The recognition of both humanity and personhood is important in a reevaluation 
of Roe.  Scientific proof of the moment the unborn becomes a human being is key; 
however, it means nothing if the Constitution does not protect this human as a “person” 
under its law.  This is where trends in both state and federal law become essential, as 
each have given protection to the unborn child as a person and a citizen. 
 80 Stenger, supra note 4, at 38. 
 81 While “philosophy” by its very nature may never be conclusive, societal value 
trends are the best gauge of the philosophical climate of the times.  This Comment uses 
current trends in state laws to measure the values of society as a whole, and as will be 
discussed, infra Subsection C, the results are quite telling. 
 82 Americans United for Life, Fetal Homicide: Model Legislation & Policy Guide for 
the 2009 Legislative Year, available at http://www.aul.org/xm_client/client_documents 
/LegislativeGuides/AUL_Fetal-Homicide-2009-LG.pdf (outlining the states with such 
provisions and specifying when in the gestation period these rights are realized). 
 83 M. Todd Parker, A Changing of the Guard: The Propriety of Appointing Guardians 
for Fetuses, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1419, 1428 (2004). 
 84 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 
953–56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 956–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Id. at 980–1020 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 85 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 23. 
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application.  As discussed above, however, the opinion sparked 
regret and calls for an overturning by the Justices themselves.86  
Congress attempted to take matters into its own hands and tried 
to pass constitutional amendments to overrule and reverse the 
case.87  While both governmental attempts have yet to be 
successful, scholarly criticism continues to unravel the 
constitutional flaws.  Scholars have overwhelmingly shown that 
the history of abortion law laid out by Justice Blackmun in Roe is 
inherently flawed.88  The grounding for Roe is said to be 
“untrustworthy and essentially worthless.”89  Scholars are nearly 
unanimous in recognizing that the primary purpose of anti-
abortion laws was to provide protection for the unborn.90  For Roe 
to conclude otherwise was “fundamentally erroneous.”91  
Moreover, notable constitutional law scholars have asserted that 
Roe has no constitutional foundation.92 
Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s conclusion that a fetus is not a 
constitutional “person” was based on his assertion that the State 
failed to cite a case where the fetus was given such status.93  
However, there was in fact a federal case holding just that—a 
 
 86 See supra Part I.C for a recap of Roe’s immediate aftermath. 
 87 Karen J. Lewis, et. al., Abortion: Legislative Response, in ABORTION—MURDER OR 
MERCY?: ANALYSIS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 17, 24 (Francois B. Gerard ed., 2001).  The 94th 
Congress alone introduced almost eighty such amendments, although each encountered 
difficulty reaching the floor of the Senate and the House.  The 98th Congress, however, 
debated and voted on a constitutional amendment that stated “[a] right to abortion is not 
secured by this Constitution.”  This amendment was defeated with a vote of 50–49. Id. at 
24–25. 
 88 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 23; Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 280; Gregory J. Roden, 
Roe v. Wade and the Common Law: Denying the Blessings of Liberty to Our Posterity, 35 
UWLA L. REV. 212, 256 (2003) (demonstrating that there is no basis in pre-Roe common 
law that would allow the Court to bind the states in 1973 to what it believed was the 
English common law at the founding of the Country). 
 89 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 23. 
 90 See, e.g., James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth Century Abortion 
Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY’S L. J. 29, 70 (1985) (“[T]he primary 
purpose of the nineteenth-century antiabortion statutes was to protect the lives of unborn 
children is clearly shown by the terms of the statutes themselves.”);; Clarke D. Forsythe & 
Stephen B. Presser, Restoring Self-Government on Abortion: A Federalism Amendment, 10 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 310 (2006) (noting that there are sixty-four cases from forty 
states establishing that the objectives of such state laws were for the protection of the 
unborn child); BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 23. 
 91 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 24 (quoting James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: 
Nineteenth Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY’S L. J. 
29, 70 (1985)).  In Justice Blackmun’s defense, it has been suggested that his reasoning 
was flawed because he relied on articles written by a scholar whose work was not 
discredited until after the Court’s opinion. Id. 
 92 Forsythe & Presser, supra note 90, at 314–15.  Such scholars include Alexander 
Bickel, Archibald Cox, John Hart Ely, Philip Kurland, Richard Epstein, Mary Ann 
Glendon, Gerald Gunther, Robert Nagel, Michael Perry, and Harry Wellington. Id. 
 93 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 26–27. 
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case cited in the Roe opinion itself.94  The case was Steinberg v. 
Brown, where the federal district court in the Northern District 
of Ohio had declined to extend the Griswold reasoning to 
abortion rights because at that point, “the preliminaries have 
ended, and a new life has begun.  Once human life has 
commenced, the constitutional protections found in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments impose upon the state the duty of 
safeguarding it.”95  Moreover, there were more than fifty cases on 
the books, both federal and state, recognizing that the unborn 
child had explicit or implicit personhood.96  The Court had, and 
still has, no constitutional prohibition to declare a fetus a 
person.97 
Thus, Roe and its progeny sit on shaky ground.  If a 
consensus on fetal humanity can be established, then the Court 
must stay true to Justice Blackmun’s admission and not only 
revisit, but also overturn, the infamous opinion. 
B. Scientific Evidence of Fetal Humanity 
To grasp the true significance of scientific developments, one 
must first become familiar with the state of the medical 
understandings before Roe.  Historically, the commonly accepted 
signifier of human life was known as “quickening,”98 the point at 
which the mother could feel the baby move.99  The belief was that 
once quickening was detectible, the unborn must have received a 
soul.100  The only reason quickening was ever a standard was 
because this was the point at which people could determine that 
the fetus was alive—and because it was alive, it was considered 
human.101  As more biological facts of human development were 
discovered, the quickening theory was dismissed.102  Instead, 
scientific technology has lead to the medical conclusion that 
human life starts at conception.103 
 
 94 Id.  Justice Blackmun cited Steinberg v. Brown as an example of a District Court 
upholding an abortion restriction that was not void for vagueness or overbroad. Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154–55 (1973). 
 95 Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746–747 (N.D. Ohio 1970). 
 96 Gregory J. Roden, Prenatal Tort Law and the Personhood of the Unborn Child: A 
Separate Legal Existence, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 207, 270 (2003). 
 97 Lugosi, supra note 24, at 438. 
 98 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 24. 
 99 BabiesOnline.com, Baby, Pregnancy, and Parenting Information: What is 
Quickening?, http://www.babiesonline.com/articles/pregnancy/quickening.asp (last visited 
September 29, 2009).  It is now known that quickening is unreliable because, although the 
baby actually starts moving by the eighth or ninth week, it could take the woman up to 26 
weeks before she can detect it. Id. 
 100 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 24. 
 101 Id. at 25. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
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1.  The Beginning of Life 
Functions that have traditionally been used to define “life” 
have been discovered to occur well within the first trimester, 
before the mother may even know that she’s pregnant.104  The 
baby’s heartbeat is detectible by the eighteenth day.105  Brain 
cells are developed within the child’s first two weeks, while 
actual brain activity has been monitored by the fifth week.106  
There is evidence that an unborn child can feel pain within eight 
weeks—meaning that the child can, in fact, feel pain during even 
the earliest abortions.107 
2.  Life that is Human 
Today, the scientific and medical community has widely 
recognized the existence of human life from the very moment of 
conception.  Many contemporary human embryologists maintain 
that a new human being comes to be at sygnamy (fertilization), 
which is the point at which the maternal and paternal 
chromosomes merge to form a set.108  Indeed, research shows that 
even after initial fertilization, “[n]o substantial changes take 
place . . . [the child] is the same individual organism as the adult 
into whom it later develops.”109  This means that once the 
chromosomes have merged in sygnamy, there is no further 
genetic information needed to “make” the unborn child into an 
individual human being. 110  The only things she needs for growth 
and development are oxygen, food, water and healthy interaction 
with her environment.111 
 
 104 It is interesting to note that Casey defined the beginning of life at respiratory 
function, which seems quite arbitrary when considering that loss of such function has 
never signified death. Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and 
Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 
ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 125–126 (2007). 
 105 See id.  
 106 Id. at 125 n.28. 
 107 Kerby Anderson, Arguments Against Abortion, LIFEWAY, Feb. 13, 2004, 
http://www.lifeway.com/ (search for “Kerby Anderson”;; then follow “Arguments Against 
Abortion” hyperlink.)  This finding directly rebuts assertions in previous cases that 
abortion is permissible because the fetus can feel no pain.  See, e.g., Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 569 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“There can be no interest in protecting the newly fertilized egg 
from physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does not yet 
exist.”). 
 108 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 66. 
 109 Lugosi, supra note 104, at 123 (quoting Angelo Serra and Robert Colombo, Identity 
and Status of the Human Embryo: The Contribution of Biology, in IDENTITY AND STATUTE 
OF HUMAN EMBRYO: PROCEEDINGS OF THIRD ASSEMBLY OF THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY FOR 
LIFE 128, 159 (Juan De Dios Vial Correa & Elio Sgreccia eds., 1998)). 
 110 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 67; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF 
THE ABSOLUTES 117 (1990). 
 111 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 67–68; TRIBE, supra note 110, at 117. 
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The evidence of human life continues to mount in the early 
stages of development.  Within five or six days of conception, the 
child has entered the “blastocyst” stage in which she has fully 
unique human DNA.112  A study of the blastocyst stage shows 
that the cells are capable of becoming only the specialized cells in 
the human body.113  While it may be tempting to simply brush off 
the presence of human DNA as merely “potential life,” biologists 
have refuted this position.114  Instead, the modern understanding 
of biologists is that the discovery of human DNA after just a few 
days irrefutably demonstrates that the child, no matter how 
small, “is human life; it is not potential life or potentially human 
life.”115 
Thus, “[i]t is scientifically correct to say that an individual 
human life begins at conception, when egg and sperm join.”116  
This is no theory: scientific proof of a separate embryonic 
personhood is an indisputable and fundamental truth—a human 
being exists from conception.117  The official labels of “blastocyst” 
or “fetus” matter not—the terms are descriptive of a stage of 
human life development, similar to the labels of “infant” or 
“adolescent.” 
Science can only go so far in the argument for constitutional 
protection for the unborn.  While it can establish humanity, the 
law itself must recognize a personhood deserving of protection.  
As will be shown next, an increase in scientific biological 
knowledge of the development of the unborn has historically led 
to more and more restrictive abortion prohibitions.118 
C. Societal Recognitions of Fetal Personhood 
Historically, common law explicitly recognized that the 
killing of an unborn child was homicide.119  The crime was, 
however, generally placed within the realm of manslaughter 
rather than of murder.120  The reason for this downgrading is 
that prior to modern scientific developments, the popular theory 
 
 112 Stenger, supra note 4, at 37. 
 113 James A. Thomson, Human Embryonic Stem Cells, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC 
STEM CELL DEBATE: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15, 17 (Suzanne Holland et al. 
eds., 2001). 
 114 Stenger, supra note 4, at 38. 
 115 Id. (emphasis added).  This is the contemporary accepted understanding of 
biologists. Id. 
 116 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 68. 
 117 Lugosi, supra note 104, at 123 (“Human embryology is so advanced there is no 
doubt that a new human being is created at the time of conception.”). 
 118 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 24. 
 119 Roger J. Magnuson & Joshua M. Lederman, Aristotle, Abortion, and Fetal Rights, 
33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 767, 777 (2007). 
 120 Id. at 778. 
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of quickening was applied.121  Contemporary laws have, however, 
reflected an expansion in the rights of the unborn, including the 
classification of fetal homicide as murder.122  If Roe was right, 
one might expect the opposite trend.  The growing rate speaks for 
itself.  In 2004, twenty-seven states deemed the killing of a fetus 
to be criminal homicide.123  By the following year, that number 
had risen to thirty-one.124  Today, thirty-six states have such 
laws.125  At this rate, every state could have such a law in less 
than a decade.  Such fetal endangerment prosecutions reflect a 
desire to protect the unborn.126  This trend has manifested itself 
in both state and federal laws. 
1.  State Criminal Laws 
After Roe held that a pre-viable unborn child is not a person 
under the Constitution, the opposite occurred in state criminal 
law.127  In refusing to take guidance from the Supreme Court’s 
viability standard for human recognition, twenty-four states have 
extended legal protection for the life of the unborn, regardless of 
the stage of pregnancy.128  Arizona acted first, amending its 
criminal law provisions to include protection for the fetus without 
any viability requirements.129  Twenty-three other states have 
since followed, the majority of which acting after Casey’s re-
opening of the door to the state’s interest.130  Thirteen more grant 
protection once the child has reached a specified stage of 
development of anywhere from seven weeks to viability.131 
California’s murder statute is a good example of side-
stepping Roe’s findings to recognize the killing of a fetal 
 
 121 Id. at 777.  See supra Subsection B for an explanation of the quickening theory. 
 122 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 285–86. 
 123 Parker, supra note 83, at 1428. 
 124 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 284. 
 125 Americans United for Life, supra note 82 (listing the thirty-six states with 
criminal laws prohibiting fetal homicide). 
 126 TRIBE, supra note 110, at 235. 
 127 Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 779. 
 128 Id. 
 129 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(5), (B) (LexisNexis 2008).  The statute deems 
manslaughter committed when a person causes “the death of an unborn child by any 
physical injury to the mother” during “any stage of its development.” Id. at (B).  To comply 
with Roe, it makes exceptions for abortion procedures. Id. at (B)(1). 
 130 In addition to Arizona, the other states granting fetal protection under criminal 
laws at all stages of the pregnancy include Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Lotierzo, supra note 
3, at 284–85 n.52. 
 131 Id.  These states include Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee 
and Washington. Id. 
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person.132  The State’s fetal protection against criminal acts 
extends to the unborn child of at least seven weeks old.133  The 
original statute had no reference to the unborn, but was added to 
correct a California Supreme Court ruling that did not allow a 
defendant to be found guilty of murder for killing a fetus.134  
While California’s courts initially followed Roe’s viability 
requirement and defined fetal murder as occurring only when the 
child would be able to survive on its own,135 in 1994 this position 
was abandoned with a recognition that Roe’s principals were 
“simply inconsistent” with fetal homicide statutes.136 
Such a trend is truly a modern movement with society 
“moving briskly toward the recognition of the personhood of the 
unborn.”137  As biologists established a better understanding of 
human science, it is no wonder that criminal liability has 
followed suit.138  The states’ respect for the humanity of the fetus 
has transcended both criminal and tort law: thirty states have 
laws in place that will immediately make abortion illegal should 
the Court reverse Roe.139 
 
 132 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2008). 
 133 People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994). 
 134 Monica Mendes, A Low Threshold of Guilt: Interpreting California’s Fetal Murder 
Statute in People v. Taylor, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2006). 
 135 Katharine B. Folger, When Does Life Begin . . . or End? The California Supreme 
Court Redefines Fetal Murder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 247 (1994); 
Mendes, supra note 134, at 1449–50. 
 136 Davis, 872 P.2d at 597; Mendes, supra note 134, at 1449, 1451. 
 137 Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 777.  Some commentators assert that 
fetal homicide laws are in harmony with abortion because they merely preserve the 
woman’s exclusive choice to continue with or terminate her pregnancy.  See, e.g., Carolyn 
B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 725 
(2006); cf. Mary Beth Hickcox-Howard, The Case for Pro-Choice Participation in Drafting 
Fetal Homicide Laws, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 317, 319–22 (2008) (explaining that fetal 
homicide laws are flawed and need to be re-drafted to avoid conflicts with abortion rights).  
But this Comment focuses on the significance of the status these laws give to the unborn 
child: homicide is the killing of a person.  If the states wanted to preserve the non-
personhood of a fetus, the offense would have been no more than criminal assault or the 
like.  In fact, pushing for this lower-level type of crime as a substitute is the very thing 
that Pro-Choice groups often lobby for when opposing the passage of a new fetal homicide 
law. Id. at 319.  Thus, fetal homicide laws are crucial because what follows is the 
reasoning that since homicide is the killing of a person, the unborn child should always be 
considered a person under the law. 
 138 It should be noted that tort law, in addition to criminal law, has increasingly 
recognized fetal personhood.  This is evidenced by the disregarding of the traditional 
“born alive” rule, which allowed for civil remedies only when the child was born alive and 
could thus bring the action herself. Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 778.  Most 
states have abandoned this rule because it made tortfeasors liable only if the child dies 
rather than if the child was only injured by the same act. Beth Driscoll Osowski, The 
Need for Logic and Consistency in Fetal Rights, 68 N.D. L. REV. 171, 175 (1992).  Instead, 
courts have recognized that there is a “trend in state courts toward greater legal rights for 
the unborn.” Id. at 183. 
 139 Associated Press, Many States Would Ban Abortion if Roe Overturned, 
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 6, 2004, at 11A. 
Do Not Delete 2/6/2010 4:36 PM 
2009] Pro [Whose?] Choice 239 
2.  Federal Laws Following Suit 
Despite failures to legislatively overturn Roe,140 Congress 
successfully passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 
(“the Ban”).141  The Ban was passed in response to Stenberg v. 
Carhart’s striking down of Nebraska’s ban on the D&X 
procedure.142  The Ban criminalized abortions that deliberately 
and intentionally begin to deliver the child until a significant 
portion of the live infant is born and then “performing an overt 
act that the [physician] knows will kill the partially delivered 
living fetus.”143  Where the Court in Stenberg had declined to 
address the live birth issue, Congress recognized that to allow 
such a procedure would be to confuse the “medical, legal, and 
ethical duties of physicians to preserve and promote life, as the 
physician acts directly against the physical life of a child, whom 
he or she had just delivered, all but the head, out of the womb, in 
order to end that life.”144 
In calling the procedure “gruesome and inhumane,” Congress 
explained that a purpose for the Ban was to protect unborn 
children, as future citizens, from experiencing “the pain 
associated with piercing his or her skull and sucking out his or 
her brain.”145  Here, there is a congressional admission that the 
fetus is a citizen in need of protection, that having “potential life” 
and being a “future citizen” means that one is entitled to current 
rights.  Also significant is that Congress outlawed the procedure 
due to the pain inflicted on the unborn child.  If pain is the 
threshold for human life and protection, the fetus would be a 
human at least at the point in which she has sensory abilities.146 
The second major federal fetal rights law is the Unborn 
Victims of Violence Act of 2004 (“the Act”).147  Also known as 
“Laci and Conner’s Law,”148 the Act makes it a separate federal 
 
 140 Congress’s attempts to overturn Roe through a constitutional amendment are 
discussed supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 141 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006). 
 142 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938–40 (2000). 
 143 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (2006); Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 279. 
 144 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–105, §§ 2(1), 2(14)(J), 117 
Stat. 1201, 1206 (2003). 
 145 Id. at 2(14)(L), (M). 
 146 Recall from supra Subsection B that an unborn child can feel pain even in the first 
trimester. 
 147 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006). 
 148 The law is named after Laci Peterson and her unborn son, Conner, the victims in 
a 2003 California case in which a husband was convicted of killing his eight-months 
pregnant wife.  Scott Peterson was convicted of double-murder and given the death 
penalty.  Though the Act had been pending in Congress, the highly-publicized case gave it 
the significant support necessary to pass. Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 780–
81. 
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crime to cause death or bodily harm to an unborn child.149  Thus, 
the murder of a pregnant woman constitutes a double homicide.  
Moreover, the law recognizes two victims, even if the mother 
survives the offense.150  Significant to the fetal rights movement 
is the fact that the Act defines “a child in utero” as “a member of 
the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is 
carried in the womb.”151  This gives the unborn child protection 
under federal law as a separate person from the moment of 
known pregnancy—viable or not.  This “advances the theory that 
unborn children should be afforded legal rights and protections 
under the Constitution.”152 
It is not surprising that scholars immediately noted the 
conflict between this legislation and the reasoning in abortion 
jurisprudence.153  And yet, the Act reflects the social climate of 
the country: the legislative history notes that eighty-four percent 
of Americans believe that separate homicide charges are 
necessary for an unborn child.154  Congress cited its purpose for 
the Act was to “respond to [the] overwhelming desire of the 
American public to provide, under Federal law, that an 
individual who injures or kills an unborn child . . . will be 
charged with a separate offense.”155 
D. The Time is Right to Correct the Wrong 
Science and legislatures are not the only entities recognizing 
the personhood of the fetus: the Court is getting close as well.  As 
notable constitutional law scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky, has 
noted, “[t]here is no area of constitutional law that cannot be 
changed by one or two appointments to the [C]ourt.”156  The anti-
Roe trend was certainly accelerated by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall resigning and being replaced by Justices Souter and 
 
 149 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006); Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 281–82.  The Act only 
applies to harm inflicted to the unborn child during the commission of a federal crime; it 
exempts the practice of abortion from liability. Id. at 283. 
 150 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 303. 
 151 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 152 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 303. 
 153 See, e.g., Amanda K. Bruchs, Clash of Competing Interests: Can the Unborn 
Victims of Violence Act and Over Thirty Years of Settled Abortion Law Co-Exist 
Peacefully?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 133, 156–57 (2004) (proposing a modification to the 
legislation that would change “child in utero” to be only viable fetuses and make the 
offense only an enhanced crime against the woman rather than a separate crime). 
 154 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 304 (citing to H.R. REP. NO. 108-420(I), at 5).  The 
Congressional findings were based on a poll by Princeton Survey Research Associates and 
indicated that more than half of the public supported separate charges regardless of how 
far along the pregnancy was. Id. at n.249. 
 155 Id. at 304 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 108-420(I), at 5). 
 156 Jill Schachner Chanen, Senate Is Hurdle for Next Supreme Court Pick, 3 ABA J. E-
REPORT, Oct. 29, 2004. 
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Thomas.157  Three of the Justices appointed by Presidents 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush made up the plurality opinion in 
Casey.158  Though the Court upheld abortion rights, this case 
marked a significant turning point as the Court upheld an 
abortion restriction similar to those it had struck down less than 
a decade earlier.159  More recently, the additions of Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito seem to have significantly quickened 
the pace towards fetal rights, with Justice Alito supplying the 
crucial fifth vote in Gonzales v. Carhart160 and Chief Justice 
Roberts procuring the first unanimous vote in the Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood.161  
Indeed, with these appointments, the Court is currently only one 
vote shy of completely overturning Roe.162 
With the Supreme Court “in flux,”163 a reconsideration of Roe 
is an unavoidable possibility.  When that day comes, the Court 
will have to take into account all of the current scientific and 
sociological developments.164  It would not be the first time the 
Court has reversed itself to correct a false assumption.165  This is 
especially true when one is reminded that at one time, women 
 
 157 MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 127 (1996).  Justices Brennan and Marshall were part of the Roe 
and Doe majorities, while Justices Souter and Thomas lean towards pro-life. Id. 
 158 BECKWITH, supra note 35, at 31–32; GRABER, supra note 157, at 127. 
 159 GRABER, supra note 157, at 127.  The law upheld in Casey, as discussed supra Part 
I.C, required informed consent and a mandatory waiting period; such laws had been 
previously struck down by City of Akron and Thornburgh. See supra note 38. 
 160 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 130 (2007).  See also Christopher E. Smith, et 
al., The Roberts Court and Criminal Justice at the Dawn of the 2008 Term, 3 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 265, 287 (2009). 
 161 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 321 
(2006); John F. Basaik, Jr., The Roberts Court and the Future of Substantive Due Process: 
the Demise of “Split-the-Difference” Jurisprudence?, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 861, 901–902 
(2007).  Ayotte is significant because the Court unanimously declined the chance to strike 
down a state law that lacked a health restriction, and instead decided the case on the 
basis of remedy. Id. 
 162 Scott A. Moss, The Courts Under President Obama, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 727, 731–
32 (2009) (pointing out that because of the Justices likely to retire within the next four 
years, the most that President Obama’s appointments will do is preserve the status quo). 
 163 Megan Fitzpatrick, Fetal Personhood After the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 58 
RUTGERS L. REV. 553, 566 (2006). 
 164 It is true that no Supreme Court Justice has officially taken the position that the 
fetus is a constitutional “person.” TRIBE, supra note 110, at 125.  However, this Comment 
takes the position that the day is inevitably coming when the Court must acknowledge 
the science of humanity and the recognition of fetal personhood as a genuine third party 
in the abortion debate.  As this section has shown, the Court itself is becoming more and 
more open to the idea of admitting its faulty reasoning and correcting its mistake. 
 165 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (overturning a 
progeny of earlier rulings dating back to Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 which had allowed for 
the segregation of public schools due to a false assumption about the extent of equal 
protection).  At least one scholar has suggested that Roe should be overturned on equal 
protection grounds just as Brown was. Lugosi, supra note 104, at 120, 287. 
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and slaves were also considered less than a “person” for the 
purpose of constitutional protection.166 
If the time is right, then this begs the question—now what?  
If Roe is reversed and constitutional protection is granted to 
unborn children, how does this affect a woman’s right to 
terminate an unwanted pregnancy?  The next two sections 
address the conflict of interests and explore compromises before 
proposing a solution that is consistent with constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
III.  THE PROBLEM:  RIGHT TO LIFE V. RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
A.  Stating the Obvious:  Recognizing the Conflicting Interests 
The law of non-contradictions necessitates a conclusion that 
“an unborn child cannot be a person and a non-person at the 
same time and in the same respect.”167  Recognizing that the 
unborn child is a person and yet unequal under the law is simply 
unjust.168  Instead, an unborn child who is granted recognition as 
a person is entitled to legal protection.169  Thus, if the fetus is 
finally given a classification as a constitutional person, then any 
legislature that permits abortion is allowing others to deprive the 
unborn child of life without due process of law and without equal 
protection—a completely unconstitutional allowance.170 
While the right to privacy has long been considered a sacred 
right,171 it is not an absolute right and can be limited by the 
conflicting right of the unborn.172  No matter where one stands on 
the abortion issue, simple logic dictates that it is wrong to 
continue to allow the absolute right of abortion in light of the 
“accelerating of protections for the rights of the unborn.”173  
Rather, there is a conflicting interest between the right to an 
abortion and the right to life that must be resolved. 
 
 166 TRIBE, supra note 110, at 119–20. 
 167 Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 786. 
 168 See Lugosi, supra note 24, at 438. 
 169 See Heather M. White, Unborn Child: Can You Be Protected?, 22 U. RICH L. REV. 
285, 288 (1988).  It has also been pointed out that when the fetus is recognized as a 
human being, the furthering of the unborn child’s rights is necessary in protecting the 
rights of born children. Charlene Quint Kalebic, Children, the Unprotected Minority: A 
Call for the Reexamination of Children’s Rights in Light of Stenberg v. Carhart, 15 
REGENT U. L. REV. 223, 228 (2003). 
 170 TRIBE, supra note 110, at 115. 
 171 Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (noting that the right of 
privacy is more “carefully guarded” than any other right).  
 172 White, supra note 169, at 292. 
 173 Magnuson & Lederman, supra note 119, at 785. 
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B. Preliminary Solutions:  Why They are Not Enough 
While many scholars have come to a consensus that the 
unborn child has a right to life, few have taken it a step further 
and offered a solution to the conflicting interests.174  Some have 
recognized that the unborn child is entitled to protection from 
tortious acts under the law and yet refrain from extending this 
conclusion to protect the child from death by abortion.175  
However, a law that protects the fetus from abuse or neglect176 
would be inconsistent if it then allows the even more grievous 
tortious act of inflicting involuntary death. 
Other scholars argue that the conflicting interests should be 
solved by leaving it up to the states to decide whether the fetus is 
a person.177  However, this is not solving the underlying issue—it 
is merely delegating the decision.178  Moreover, even if it were left 
to the states, more issues would arise as a result of inconsistent 
laws.  Consider the obvious problem that will arise when citizens 
of an anti-abortion state cross into a pro-abortion state in order 
to get the procedure.179  If the fetus is a protected citizen of one 
state, would this status change simply because her mother 
traveled into another state?180  What if the child is conceived in a 
state that deems the child a person, yet his mother is a resident 
of a state (or later moves to a state) where no personhood is 
recognized until birth?  Federalism simply cannot be relied on in 
this context because the truth as to the beginning of human life 
is not discretionary.  History dictates that personhood is not 
something that can change based on geographic location: the 
Thirteenth Amendment was passed precisely to remove the 
state’s power of deeming a class of citizens non-persons simply 
because of their race.181  In the same way, there should be no 
 
 174 See, e.g., id. at 785–86 (pointing out the illogic of abortion rights but refraining 
from calling for a solution); Lugosi, supra note 24, at 437 (arguing that the fetus has 
constitutional protection but leaves it up to the states to pass laws that outlaw abortion to 
spur a reversal of Roe). 
 175 See, e.g., White, supra note 169, at 288 (arguing that the fetus may have 
protection under the law from abuse and neglect, as long as this does not “overste[p] the 
parameters of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade”). 
 176 Id. 
 177 TRIBE, supra note 110, at 126. 
 178 Furthermore, Roe specifically stated that should personhood be established, then 
the unborn child’s right to life would be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, thus 
preventing any state from making the decision to allow abortions. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 156–57 (1973).  For a further discussion, see Part IV, infra. 
 179 Id. at 127. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See Alexander Tsesis, Principled Governance: the American Creed and 
Congressional Authority, 41 CONN. L. REV. 679, 706–708 (2009) (explaining that the 
legislative intent behind the Thirteenth Amendment was to guarantee that the states 
would not be able to undermine equality under the law). 
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state-by-state determination of personhood based on the 
arbitrary factors of age, size and economic status.  There needs to 
be consistency among all of the states to prevent such disputes, 
as they subject the existence of human life to varying degrees of 
interpretation when it is instead a question of fact. 
At least one scholar has suggested that deeming a fetus a 
person is problematic because it treats women as incubators, 
inferring that this alone should preserve the right to an 
abortion.182  This, however, has nothing to do with addressing the 
conflict between the interests.  Even if the woman is an 
“incubator,” this argument does not adequately address the right 
to life versus the right to be free from being an “incubator.”183  
Instead, it is merely a restatement of the conflict between a 
woman’s liberty interest of being free from carrying an unwanted 
child and that child’s interest in living.  But hardship on a 
woman’s liberty interest has no bearing on the actual physical 
personhood of the child she is carrying; while it may make some 
more comfortable with the idea of abortion, it does not diminish 
or resolve the underlying issue. 
Another scholar has suggested that the conflict of interests is 
three-fold: state, child and mother.184  To resolve these interests, 
a balancing test is proposed in which the “interests of unborn 
children should be weighed alongside those of pregnant women 
and the state in legislative enactments and judicial review of 
abortion laws.”185  Because this scholar concludes that this would 
be a case-by-case analysis, there is no suggestion of how to apply 
this balancing test.186  A case-by-case analysis is unworkable.  In 
every case, the fundamental interests are the same: interest in 
protecting future citizens versus interest in saving one’s life 
versus interest in obtaining an abortion.  Without offering a 
solution of how to weigh the competing interests, all that is 
present is, again, an acknowledgement of the problem. 
Thus, scholars have generally left an actual solution still 
wanting.  Below is a proposal that is more consistent in 
applicability and resolving of the underlying issue. 
 
 182  TRIBE, supra note 110, at 130. 
 183 Moreover, it is worth noting that in most cases, the woman either consciously or 
negligently became this “incubator.” 
 184 Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 311–12. 
 185 Id. at 281. 
 186 Id. at 312. 
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IV.  SOLUTION:  RIGHT TO LIFE MUST PREVAIL 
The solution to the conflicting interests comes from what one 
might find an unlikely source: Roe itself.  The opinion suggests 
that the right to life would prevail over the right to privacy.187  
Recall Roe’s own admission that once “personhood is established, 
the [case for abortion rights] of course, collapses, for the fetus’ 
right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment.”188  Here, Justice Blackmun does not 
state that when fetal personhood is accepted, the right to life 
becomes inherent only at a certain point in the pregnancy.  Nor 
does he state that when fetal personhood is accepted, a balancing 
test must be employed.  To the contrary, the fetus’ life is 
constitutionally protected and the entire case for abortion rights 
collapses.  This means that abortion’s right of privacy cannot be 
sustained against the right of life.  Simply put, the right of a 
human being to live, in any analysis, must always trump the 
liberty right to terminate that life.189 
Merely because the unborn child lacks the capacity to assert 
her rights and equal protection under the law is not an excuse to 
ignore and deny those rights.190  Clearly, the unborn child would 
benefit from exercising her Fourteenth Amendment right to live, 
her right to prevent involuntary death.191  The unborn child has 
the right to choose life for herself.  The fact that she cannot 
express it for herself does not diminish this right.  Normally, the 
child’s guardian would represent this right, but here this is the 
very person with the conflicting interest.  Thus, it is necessary 
for the state to step in and protect the child’s rights.192 
Abortion supporters will likely rebut this proposition by 
asserting that the right of privacy gives the woman autonomy 
over her own body without government interference; that a 
woman will be subjected as an “incubator” if not given the choice 
 
 187 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973); Lotierzo, supra note 3, at 300.  
 188 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–57. 
 189 It is important to note here that abortions necessary to save the mother’s life are 
purposely left out of this analysis.  This is because when the mother’s life is actually 
threatened, the conflicting interests change to the right to life versus the right to life, 
rather than the right to liberty versus the right to life.  This Comment focuses on the 
latter because abortion jurisprudence has allowed for abortions essentially on demand, 
regardless of the condition of the mother. See supra note 6. 
 190 Rhonheimer, supra note 9, at 161. 
 191 Id. 
 192 This reasoning has been applied in European countries such as Germany that 
protect the life of the unborn except in situations where the mother’s life is truly at stake.  
The German court not only held that criminalizing abortion was permitted, but 
constitutionally required in order to protect the lives of the unborn. Stephen Gardbaum, 
State and Comparative Constitutional Law Perspectives on a Possible Post-Roe World, 51 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 685, 691 (2007). 
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whether to carry her child to term.193  The proposed solution is 
not meant to discriminate against women’s rights, but rather to 
promote the rights of the unborn human being who has no choice 
but to be carried by her mother for the first nine months of her 
existence. 
Moreover, the right of privacy assumes that the actions one 
is taking affect only oneself.  As soon as the actions have a 
negative impact on another person, the actions transcend from 
private to social.194  The unborn child is only lacking in 
independence because her age requires her mother’s womb to 
assure survival.  This is no different from a post-birth child who 
depends on her parent’s provisions of food and clothing to 
survive.  For that matter, it is no different from any disabled or 
incapacitated adult. 
A fundamental truth of human rights is that the value of 
human life cannot be measured by age, size or desirability.  To 
deny an unborn child equal protection as a person simply because 
she is small and young is scientifically incorrect.  To permit a 
mother to end the life of her developing baby simply because she 
does not want the inconvenience of a pregnancy or parenthood is 
constitutionally wrong.  Roe itself called for the recognition of 
fetal personhood in light of an expansion of medical and social 
developments,195 and once recognized, this person’s life must be 
protected above another’s lesser right.  While it may not be the 
easiest solution to swallow and would take a humble Court ready 
to correct more than three decades of embarrassing missteps, it 
is the right thing to do. 
CONCLUSION 
Immediate and constant criticisms of Roe and its progeny, 
together with the Court’s own admission that the issue must be 
readdressed when more information is known, make 
reconsideration inevitable.  The Court cannot forever hide from 
the scientific truths that have been discovered, nor the trends in 
legislation.  Thus, the recognition of fetal personhood is no longer 
an “if” but a “when.”  And when that day comes, the Court must 
 
 193 Some scholars have anticipated that the time of recognizing fetal personhood is 
drawing near and have made this argument.  See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 110, at 130. 
 194 See, e.g., Lugosi, supra note 24, at 438 (“[T]here is a limit to personal liberty when 
its exercise is incompatible with not just the liberty of another, but the life of another 
person.”). 
 195 Recall that Justice Blackmun asserted that the reason for failing to determine 
fetal personhood was because “those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, 
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 159 (1973); see supra Part I.B.  Now that there is such a consensus, the Court must 
be compelled to recognize personhood as well. See supra Part II. 
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render a solution to the competing interests between mother and 
child.  To stay consistent with both constitutional and human 
rights principals, the Court should stay true to its admission in 
Roe and let the right to abortions “collapse.” 
